The objective of this paper is to study empirically how post-acquisition decisions and learning from previous acquisition experience affect the long-term performance of acquiring firm. Using financial, accounting and questionnaire response data, we investigate the postacquisition long-term performance of 47 US bank holding companies that executed 320 acquisitions in the 1986-1995 period and compare it with their competitors' performance. Applying a long-term event study methodology, we regress measures of abnormal financial performance on a set of explanatory variables, which include measures of post-acquisition decisions, such as the degree of integration of the target within the acquirer's structure and the replacement of the top management team, as well as approximations of the acquirer's capability to implement the integration process.
I. Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) considerably affect the value of companies involveda successful M&A can bring billions of dollars to shareholders, while failure can destroy most of the company's value and bring it to the brink of bankruptcy as was the example of Wells Fargo bank in 1996-1998 1 . In order to explain such variation in outcomes, the existing literature focuses its research on both the true motives of acquisitions, i.e., why M&As take place, and on how they are actually executed starting from identification and evaluation of the target, continuing through the negotiation process and ending with post-acquisition decisions. This paper contributes to the second research question. It studies empirically how post-acquisition decisions and learning from previous acquisition experience affect the post-acquisition long-term performance of acquiring firm.
Several explanations are put forward as the motives for mergers. The first group of explanations emphasizes economic reasons, i.e., M&As' raison d'être is efficiency improvement.
As a result, companies should be acquired, if they are not performing well. Competitive reallocation transfers assets to better performers. The evidence is controversial. Thus, Wheelock and Wilson (2000) find that the closer to insolvency a bank is, the more likely is its acquisition; Stiroh and Strahan (2002) report a substantial reallocation of market share through acquisitions of better banks. On the other hand, Hannan and Rhoades (1987) find that there is no indication that poorly managed banks are more likely to be acquired than well-managed firms. According to the second economic explanation, a new bigger company can benefit from economies of scale and from increased market power. Literature lends some support to this explanation. For example, Kane (2000) shows that giant U.S. banks gain additional value from becoming more gigantic and when they absorb an in-state competitor; Cornett and Tehranian (1992) find that merged banks outperform the banking industry and that their better performance appears to result from improvements in the ability to attract loans and deposits, in employee productivity, and in profitable asset growth.
The second strand of literature explains M&As as a result of agency problems. A traditional empire building argument is that managers act in their self-interests and larger firm size brings them more benefits. In addition to "empire building", Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) and Gorton, Kahl and Rosen (2002) argue that in order to keep their private benefits of control, managers of potential targets entrench themselves by acquiring other companies, thus making their company a less attractive target itself. Milbourn, Boot and Thakor (1999) give the agency problem a behavioral spin by showing that CEOs' desire to enhance their reputation could lead to herd behavior "involving banks that increase size and scope despite a dissipation of shareholders' wealth." However, Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) find little evidence that target firms were performing poorly before acquisition, using either operating or stock returns and show that mergers are not corrections of agency problem.
Agency explanations leading to suboptimal deployment of free cash flows leave unresolved the problem of deteriorating post-acquisition performance, which often is in stark contrast with the enviable record of success and the sterling reputation of some acquirers, like, the ones that Wells Fargo enjoyed at the time of the First Interstate acquisition. In fact, the event can be interpreted as showing that even superior performing firms (and presumably capable management teams) can miserably fail to manage acquisition processes 2 .
Other literature, which this paper contributes to, focuses on how mergers are executed.
Target identification is studied in Kane (2000) , who frames the opportunity cost of any merger as the value of alternative deals it precludes or deters, thus explaining immediate stock price reaction to announced deals. If a better alternative target were the market's favorite, reaction would be negative, and vice versa. As proxies of a fit between the companies, literature looks at the pre-acquisition characteristics of the two firms, such as their prior performance (Land, Stulz and Walkling, 1989; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Heron and Lee, 2002) , growth rate (Morck, Schleifer and Vishny, 1990) , degree of business overlap (Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1992) and strategic intent (Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1997) . These characteristics are clearly important determinants of the acquiring firm's post-acquisition performance, but they can provide only a very rough estimate of the kind of difficulties the acquirer can potentially experience in the postacquisition phase.
The characteristics and outcomes of the negotiation process, such as the degree of hostility, the number of bidders or the form of payment (Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1992; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Travlos and Papaioannou, 1991; Heron and Lee, 2002 ) might offer only limited help in explaining the post-acquisition performance. A hostile negotiation process does not need to translate into a hostile post-acquisition integration approach, and the amount and terms of payment can hardly be considered meaningful factors in influencing integration choices.
For example, Heron and Lee (2002) find no evidence that the method of payment conveys information about the acquirer's future operating performance.
In this paper, we argue that there are at least two classes of explanatory variables that have not received much attention so far in the financial economics literature, and that their inclusion might considerably improve the descriptive power of our models of post-acquisition performance in acquiring firms. The first class of explanatory variables has to do with the way the acquisition is actually managed after its completion. Is the target firm integrated within the structures and operations of the acquiring firm or has it been kept independent as a stand-alone unit? Are key resources such as top managers, brand names or even physical facilities being retained or replaced? Through these decisions and the actions taken to implement them, the acquiring firm creates or destroys value for its shareholders, but unfortunately this aspect of M&As has been left largely unexplored and unexplained by the literature.
The second class of factors is related to the observation that the correct identification of the post-acquisition integration tasks, e.g. conversion of information systems, integration of logistics and distribution, coordination of sales and marketing strategy, selection, retention and motivation of acquired human resources, is a formidable managerial challenge, one that most firms do not appear to be equipped to tackle. The degree to which the acquiring firm has developed competencies and routines related to the management of the acquisition process, and of the post-acquisition integration phase in particular, ought to be considered as another key determinant of the variation in acquirers' post-acquisition performance. Two broad mechanisms, one based on simple accumulation of acquisition experience, i.e., "learning-by-doing", and the other on specific investments in the articulation and codification of knowledge from prior acquisitions, will be considered as approximations of firm learning processes.
The other problem we need to tackle is the evaluation of these new sets of explanatory variables from a market perspective. If integration decisions and learning processes are of any relevance, then we should observe their impact on the acquiring company's post-acquisition performance -changes in earnings and stock returns. Whereas the implications of earning variations are relatively straightforward, one has to be more careful, when studying the effect on stock price returns, with respect to the relevant time horizon and the exact construction of these returns.
To illustrate, if the market "understands" the link between the acquiring firm's capability to manage the integration process and its future performance, then it should be able to anticipate the acquirer's future managerial actions and to adjust the price immediately at the time of the acquisition announcement. Of course, all post-acquisition managerial actions cannot be perfectly predicted at the time of announcement, and, therefore, one should observe further price adjustment over a longer period of time, once these decisions have actually been made and announced. In this case, we should observe the significance of these factors in determining abnormal stock returns over a relatively short, but not immediate, period (say one to two years).
If, on the other hand, the market does not recognize this link, then the prices will adjust over an even longer period (e.g., three to four years) after the effects of post acquisition decisions will have brought tangible results, like improved earnings and changes in other operating performance measures.
The research hypothesis can be summarized as follows. If the acquirer selects the appropriate integration approach among the available alternatives, invests sufficient time and effort to extract from its own past acquisition experiences the valuable lessons and uses this knowledge to constantly improve its management of the integration process, then the postacquisition performance of its transactions should be systematically superior to the one of competitors that either select sub-optimal integration approaches, or invest less time in introspecting and learning.
To test this hypothesis, we use the event studies approach with both short-term and longterm financial abnormal returns. 3 Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) point out that "…test statistics based on long-term abnormal returns calculated using the market index as a reference portfolio are severely misspecified". We therefore follow the approach adopted by Ikenberry et al. (1995) , Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Lyon et al. (1999) , using both cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns calculated with reference portfolios, constructed from firms matching our firms of interest by size and market-to-book ratio.
Using financial, accounting and questionnaire response data we investigate the postacquisition performance of 47 US bank holding companies that executed 320 acquisitions in1986-1997. The focus on a single industry is forced by the choice in the research methodology, which blends archival data with primary data about the post-acquisition decisions and learning processes obtained through a detailed, industry-specific, questionnaire-based survey. The banking industry gives us additional homogeneity of a sample in the dimension of the takeovers' typeall takeovers in the period studied were friendly and driven primarily by strategic rationales (either cost efficiencies or revenue enhancements through cross-selling).
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Results suggest that both integration decisions and learning from prior experiences do play an important role in explaining the variation in performance of the focal acquisition. The level of integration of the acquired firm within the acquirer's organization is positively related to performance, while the replacement of the target's management influences performance in a strong and negative way. With respect to the integration capability, the accumulation of prior acquisition experience is not conducive to improved performance, but the degree of codification of acquisition-specific knowledge in manuals and systems does improve post-acquisition performance, particularly so at increasingly high levels of integration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we link existing literature in finance and corporate strategy with the variables of interest and advance testable hypotheses. Section III describes the data and methodology, Section IV presents the results and Section V concludes.
II. Testable Hypotheses

A. Post-acquisition Integration and Firm Learning
As we noted above, the literature on acquisitions has focused on the pre-requisites and on the performance implications of acquisition events, leaving the efficiency with which the target is integrated into the acquirer largely unexplored. This omission might imply, in addition to a considerable loss of explanatory power in our post-acquisition performance models, a lack of attention to learning processes in acquisition contexts. The integration phase represents in fact the most novel, i.e. different from regular operations, and probably the most complex set of activities, compared to the other steps of the acquisition process (identification, evaluation and negotiation of the investment opportunity), acquiring firms need to execute. This is why we will study the learning question together with the integration decision-making problem. Acquiring firms need to learn both what set of integration decisions are most appropriate to maximize shareholders' value creation, and how they are supposed to execute them while minimizing the risks of value destruction that these activities often imply (see the Wells Fargo example).
Post-acquisition Decisions.
The first decision we consider has to do with the degree to which the acquired organization is integrated within the acquirer's. In a banking context, this implies to know whether the information systems have been converted, the product lines standardized, the payroll and MIS uniformed, the loan processing centralized, etc. This type of decision has been recently introduced in the study of bank mergers in finance (Thakor, 1999) , and has only a slightly longer tenure in the strategic management literature (Datta and Grant, 1990; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Shanley, 1994) . The intuitive expectation of a positive influence of the level of integration on performance, motivated by the necessity to structurally integrate the two firms in order to realize the value potential from economies of scale and scope, has not found so far sufficient corroboration from empirical evidence, and will therefore be one of the objects of our analysis.
The second dimension relates to the degree to which the pre-acquisition resources of the target are either kept in place, brought in line with those of the acquirer, or disposed of. Examples include, but are not limited to, the replacement of the top management team, of the company name and identity, of the headquarters and other facilities, of brand names, and so on. Given a certain level of organizational integration targeted, the acquirer has a choice in deciding how aggressive it wants to be in replacing pre-existing resources. Does it prefer to build consensus in aligning the use of target's resources to the practices adopted by the acquirer, or does it find it more appropriate to speed up the process and eradicate any opposition and uncertainty by replacing or disposing of the acquired firm's resources? The analysis of the performance implications of this decision will have to control for the quality of the target's resources as well as the interaction between the quality and the replacement.
Prior literature in financial economics confirms that the link between corporate acquisitions and managerial turnover of acquired firms is a relevant phenomenon. Hadlock, Houston and Ryngaert (1999) examine the effect of variables related to management incentives, corporate governance and performance on the likelihood that a bank is acquired. They document high rates of management turnover following bank acquisitions. Martin and McConnell (1991) document that "the turnover rate for the top manager of target firms in tender offers significantly increases following completion of the takeover and that prior to the takeover these firms were significantly under-performing other firms in their industry as well as other target firms which had no post-takeover change in the top executive." The existing literature, however, does not provide an empirical test evaluating the performance implications of managerial turnover in corporate acquisitions.
Firm Learning.
Intimately tied to the problem of selecting the most opportune integration approach is the one of developing firm-level capabilities specific to the implementation of the integration process. For example, many acquiring banks in the US have now learned how to convert the information systems and the entire branch network of the acquired institution following a socalled "big bang" approach, where the entire process is executed during the space of a weekend.
During the 80s, however, few acquisitions were managed with this technique, and information systems were either not converted or converted slowly, in batches of branches grouped by geographic zone. European bank acquisitions, a rather new phenomenon compared to the US, are still typically managed with the conservative "batch", as opposed to the faster but riskier "big bang" approach. The ability to convert information systems in one solution, and without unexpected and prolonged imbalances in the daily closings of the accounts, can therefore be considered an example of an acquisition-specific capability developed by the acquiring organization (Thakor, 1999) . Another example is the completion of the personnel evaluation process and the communication of its results within a short timeframe (e.g. few weeks) from the closing date of the transaction. This might have an important effect on the ability of the combined entity to retain and motivate employees (Schweiger and DeNisi, 1992) , and therefore on the probability to successfully implement the integration decisions.
How does an integration capability emerge? More generally, how do firms learn, codify and apply their expertise in subsequent M&As? In this paper, we take into consideration two learning mechanisms. The first one relies on "learning-by-doing" processes and can be approximated by the simple accumulation of prior acquisition experience 5 . The second mechanism is derived from the explicit efforts made by the group involved in the process to understand the causal linkages between decisions/actions made and performance outcomes (Zollo and Winter, 2002) . These "off-line" learning efforts take the form of knowledge articulation and codification processes whereby firm members discuss and share their respective experiences, write performance evaluation reports and develop process-specific tools 6 . In the acquisition context, acquiring firms might, for example, be able to develop increasingly sophisticated post-acquisition integration routines by developing integration manuals, check-lists and decision support software, by analyzing process performance metrics and writing post-mortem analyses.
We argue that knowledge codification might have a positive influence on the performance of acquisition processes for several reasons:
• These tools serve as repositories of organizational memory; they provide a trace of what was decided and done in past instances, particularly useful in relatively infrequent and complex processes such as acquisitions
• They facilitate the diffusion of knowledge to parts of the organization different from the one where the higher level of understanding is achieved. For example, a manual provides a fast and effective training for people new to the process.
• They clarify the roles, responsibilities and deadlines for all the people involved in the execution of large numbers of inter-dependent tasks, thereby facilitating the coordination of the entire process.
• Finally, and in our opinion most importantly, the process by which these tools are created and 
B. Testable hypotheses
The arguments presented above highlight the presence of important trade-offs in each of the post-acquisition decisions analyzed. In the case of the level of integration, the acquiring firm will have to weight the benefits from realizing economies of scale and scope with the costs derived from higher levels of complexity in the management of the integration process. On one hand, the structural and operational integration of the acquired firm within the acquiring organization is often the only way in which the expected economies of scale and of scope can be realized. On the other hand, it increases the probability to disrupt existing routines and to inadvertently destroy valuable competencies within the acquired units. The evaluation of the relative strength of the two contrasting effects is clearly an empirical problem. We advance, therefore, the following hypothesis for the empirical test:
H1: Ceteris paribus, The higher the level of post-acquisition integration, the better the acquiring firm's post-acquisition performance.
Further, the decision about the replacement of target's resources can be viewed as the result of attempts to balance the costs and benefits deriving from a more aggressive pursuit of the desired level of integration among the two firms. If the benefits of resource replacement outweigh the costs, the standard view of acquisitions as a policing mechanism for agency problems, whereby better top management teams replace poorly performing ones on the market for corporate control (Manne, 1965) , would be supported. However, the only existing evidence on the performance implications of the replacement of the target's top management team (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Krishna, Miller and Judge, 1997) seems to indicate that costs are superior to the benefits of replacing existing managers, and that this second dimension of the integration process has an overall negative impact on acquisition performance. We will then test the following hypothesis:
H2: Ceteris paribus, the acquiring firm's post-acquisition performance decreases with degree of replacement of the top management team of the acquired firm.
If no disciplining of the incumbent management team is deemed necessary, for example, if prior to the acquisition the target bank has been performing well, then the benefits of replacement become more questionable. In this case, the interaction term between the target quality and the replacement of its management team, should have a negative effect on postacquisition performance of the acquirer. Therefore, we can put forward the following hypothesis:
H3: Ceteris paribus, replacement of the top management has an increasingly negative impact on the acquirer's post-acquisition performance, the better the pre-acquisition performance of the target.
The next and final step in our analysis consists in the assessment of the relative effectiveness of experience accumulation and knowledge codification processes in influencing acquisition performance and how these two mechanisms are related to each other. The accumulation of acquisition experience relies on the ability of individuals exposed to past experiences to recall the lessons tacitly absorbed and apply them to the current situation. This works well when the task to be mastered is frequent, sufficiently homogeneous and relatively unambiguous in its links between the actions or decisions made and the performance outcomes obtained. If one or more of these assumptions are relaxed, though, learning becomes correspondingly more difficult. In extreme cases, characterized for instance by particularly high heterogeneity and causal ambiguity, individuals might end up applying lessons learned in one context to a seemingly similar but inherently different one. In these cases, known in cognitive psychology as negative transfer effects (Holyoak, 1985; Gick and Holyoak, 1987) , past experience not only does not help enhance the performance of the current task, but it might actually hinder it. Corporate acquisitions, unfortunately, are likely to be part of this last category of organizational tasks, where the coupling of low frequency, high heterogeneity and high causal ambiguity might very well increase the probability of negative learning effects. In the first empirical study to test these arguments in the acquisitions context, in fact, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) find support for a quadratic, U-shaped, relationship between acquisition experience and acquirers' stock price performance, with minimum at around 9 acquisition experiences.
Conscious of the likely limitations of the "learning-by-doing" mechanism in the acquisition context, we submit the following hypothesis for empirical test in both a linear and a quadratic model specification.
H4: Ceteris paribus, the acquiring firm's post-acquisition performance increases with the acquiring firm's past acquisition experience.
Following the arguments made above, however, explicit cognitive efforts aimed at understanding the causal links between past actions and past performance might actually represent at least a partial solution to the limitations of the tacit experience accumulation mechanism in these difficult learning conditions. Knowledge codification, then, might prove to be a more powerful learning mechanism, compared with tacit experience accumulation in particularly complex learning environments, such as acquisition processes. Even knowledge codification comes at a price, though. The costs related to the investment of time, energy and managerial attention in creating and updating these tools might at some point overcome the benefits of developing collective competence. The positive influence of knowledge codification on performance might, therefore, reach a plateau and even turn negative at very high levels.
Similarly to H4, then, we submit the following hypothesis for empirical test in both a linear and a quadratic model specification.
H5: Ceteris paribus, the acquiring firm's post-acquisition performance increases with the degree of codification of knowledge derived from past acquisition experience.
Task Complexity and Learning.
Finally, it is interesting to test the explanatory power of the two learning mechanisms at increasing degrees of the complexity of the task. In the case at hand, task complexity can be proxied by the level of integration, since the managerial challenge in managing acquisition obviously increases as the integration level between the two firms increases. In theory, both learning processes should become increasingly necessary (hence strongly and positively correlated to abnormal returns) as the complexity of the task increases. By comparing the performance impacts between the two learning mechanisms and performance, though, we can have an additional test of their relative effectiveness in the M&A context. We therefore submit the following hypotheses for empirical validation.
H6:
At increasing levels of integration, the positive influence of acquisition experience on acquisition performance strengthens.
H7:
At increasing levels of integration, the positive influence of knowledge codification on acquisition performance strengthens.
III. Methodology
In this section we describe the model used for empirical testing, the characteristics of the data gathered for such purpose and the measurement issues related to the research design adopted, with particular emphasis on the measurement of the dependent variable.
A. The Model
Following the discussion in the previous section, we specify the model as follows:
where n is the index of a particular merger announcement. The interaction terms between codification and integration, and between experience and integration are meant to capture eventual increasing performance effects of the knowledge codification processes and experience accumulation at increasing levels of the complexity of the task, as per H6 and H7. Likewise, the interaction term between codification and experience helps us test hypothesis H6 that these two learning mechanisms are substitutes. Interaction between the quality of the acquired firm and replacement of its management is captured by the "quality-replacement" term. The expected signs for the coefficients are: b>0, c<0, d>0, e>0, f>0, g>0 and h>0, whereas the error term is distributed according to the standard normality assumptions.
As controls we used a set of pre-acquisition attributes of the acquiring and the acquired firm: acquirer's size, relative target's size, target's pre-acquisition performance ("target quality") and the geographical overlap between the two branch networks ("target relatedness"). 7 For robustness checks, we also added dummy variables "pre-1988", "pre-1990" equal to one for acquisitions announced before 1988 or 1990, respectively, to control for changes in regulation of banking mergers. These coefficients (not reported here) are non significant for all dependent variables.
Coefficients were estimated using an ordinary least squares regression model. Weightedleast squares and stepwise regression produce essentially the same results of the analysis reported. Since codification and integration are highly correlated with their interaction term, zscores transformations of both variables were utilized and then multiplied to create the interaction term. This eliminated the multicollinearity problem in the estimated model (VIF was lower than 3 for all the covariates). Four outliers were identified as the observations more than 3 standard deviations away from the mean of the dependent variable, and excluded from the analysis.
Possible biases in the coefficient estimates due to the existence of multiple observations per acquiring firm have been checked statistically with the use of dummy variables for the most experienced acquirers (see the "Robustness of the Results" part in Section IV). No other violations to the standard normality assumptions were detected in the data.
To adjust for the sample selection bias, Heckman's two-step selection correction estimation procedure has been used with Green's modification to obtain consistent errors. This procedure is described in Heckman (1979) and Greene (1981) . The first step uses the probit model equation to estimate the likelihood of any bank from (Compustat) population to be included into our sample of acquiring banks:
where Selection is equal to 1 if bank belongs to the M&A sample and zero otherwise. The second stage uses the ordinary least square regression modified to obtain consistent errors following Greene (1981) . The regression equation is
where λ n is Heckman's correction obtained from the first step.
B. Data
The test of the hypotheses derived above was carried out on a sample of acquisitions in the US banking industry. The industry selected was considered particularly appropriate in light of the intense acquisition activity characterizing the sector, and of the qualitative evidence, gathered through a round of interviews with managers in 12 experienced acquirers, of both cross-sectional and longitudinal differences in the way acquirers manage the integration process and develop standardized and codified implementation procedures.
We use data from several sources of different nature. We collect information about the announcement dates and participants of bank acquisitions from the SNL and/or SDC databases.
The SNL DataSource serves as a resource of both current and historical financial information and market data on the financial services industries. Its M&A Deals section offers information on mergers and acquisitions for the banks and thrifts market, the financial services industry, and the insurance industry.
In event studies, it is very important to identify the exact dates of events. We consider SNL data to be a more reliable source, as it is specialized in tracking down acquisitions in the banking sector and it routinely follows up any announcement with a brief questionnaire sent to the acquiring bank to check and gather precise data. When different dates existed for the same event, we consulted the Lexis-Nexis database as a third source. In cases of discrepancies, we always selected the earliest announcement date as the event date.
We then used CRSP tapes from January 1977 to December 1998 to extract companies' monthly returns for one year before and four years after the announcement. We also used CRSP value-weighted index return as a proxy for the market return.
From Compustat tapes, we obtained historical accounting information about these 47 companies or their predecessors for a period starting in 1985 and ending in 1997. The decreasing number of banks covered in the years previous to 1985 discouraged us in pursuing older starting years.
In order to enhance the comparability among observations and the precision of the exercise, mergers of equals and acquisitions with repeated announcements from the data set were excluded from the sample.
In order to gather non-public data on post-acquisition integration decisions and on the acquisition-specific tools eventually developed by the acquiring firms, a questionnaire-based survey was administered under a grant by the Sloan Foundation and with the support of the Wharton Financial Institutions Center. The survey was developed after a one-year fieldwork and in cooperation with 12 experienced bank acquirers and then rolled out to the largest 250 U.S.
bank holding companies. 8 The survey consisted of an "Acquisition History Profile", where information on a set of variables, including target's asset quality, market overlap (in-market vs.
out-market transaction), post-acquisition integration level and target's management replacement, was gathered for each acquisition completed since founding. It also had a 5-page questionnaire on the general characteristics of the acquisition process adopted by the respondents, including the existence and the time of development of acquisition-specific tools, such as due diligence checklists and manuals, system conversion manuals, branch staffing and product mapping software, HR affiliation manuals, project management software and so on.
Using survey results has its strengths and weaknesses. Survey responses give us a unique opportunity to learn "insider information." We have to be aware, of course, of the dangers of selfselection bias and response bias.
Response bias normally appears, if respondents choose the answer using their subjective judgment, which may be affected by social desirability biases and by cognitive limitations. This is not an issue in our survey, because the key theoretical variables measured through the survey instrument are not "opinions", but factual reports. Acquisition experience was measured as the number of transactions completed by the acquirer before the focal one. Knowledge codification was proxied with the count of tools developed by the acquiring firm at the time of the focal acquisition. The level of integration was the response to a detailed question that mentioned actual integration activities, such as the conversion of information systems, the alignment of the lending procedures and the standardization of the product line. The replacement of the top management team was also the response to a question, which clearly spelled out the meaning of four increasing levels, from complete retention to complete substitution. Finally, the dependent variable was the quantitative measure of abnormal return, rather than subjective assessments on the quality of the outcomes, as often done in management studies. In addition, construct validity of the single item scales (integration, replacement, target relatedness and target quality) was checked with multiple item scales gathered on a sub-sample of 57 acquisitions by 29 acquirers through a second, survey conducted with an 8-page questionnaire gathering detailed data on the characteristics of the acquired bank and of the post-acquisition integration decisions. All, but the relatedness construct, resulted highly correlated both with the single factor extracted by the multidimensional scales, and with the sum of their standardized values (Nunnally (1978) ). The relatedness measure was correlated only with external factors, such as the geographic location and the type of customers served, and will hence be referred to as "market overlap", as opposed to the wider notion of resource relatedness.
Self-selection bias is harder to tackle. Since our objective is to study empirically how knowledge from previous experience and post-acquisition decisions affect performance, the self- was not biased with respect to the original universe in terms of earning ratios (ROA, ROE and efficiency ratios), but biased in terms of asset size (the sample banks were larger, p < .05) and the number of acquisitions performed.
As we have mentioned, we also used Heckman correction for the selection bias to check the robustness of our results. The results are reported in Section IV.
C. Performance Measurement
For long-term performance, we calculate results for up to 48 months following the announcement. As Barber and Lyon (1997) indicate, "commonly used research designs yield test statistics that are misspecified in cases where sample firms have performed either unusually well or poorly." For this reason, we use two different types of financial measures to evaluate longterm performance. 10 We followed Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998) 's approach to the estimation of long-term stock price returns, which requires the calculation of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) relative to a benchmark portfolio (4 years after the announcement), whereas the other measure calculates abnormal performance assuming a buyand-hold strategy. Abnormal returns are calculated relative to two benchmarks: beta-adjusted market model and size-and market-to-book (MTB) based benchmark, in which the MTB ratio served as a proxy for Tobin's Q. We also used the Fama-French three-factor model, which gave results similar to the beta-adjusted model. In order to estimate the market alpha and beta for the beta-adjusted and the Fama-French model, we use a period of 60 months before the announcement date 11 .
Abnormal returns adjusted for both size and MTB ratio were computed dividing the universe of companies on the CRSP tape into 100 portfolios for every month of observation.
Unlike traditional portfolio selection, where companies are first ranked by their size and then within each size decile by their MTB ratio, we rank our portfolios by size and by the MTB ratio simultaneously and do it for every month. The unconditional ranking and the larger number of reference portfolios (100 instead of a more traditional 50) allow us to combine the advantages of a closer match of firm characteristics offered by the control company method, with the statistical stability of the benchmark portfolio method. The abnormal performance of each firm from our sample is then calculated each month in comparison to the portfolio the firm belonged to in that particular month.
For the buy-and-hold abnormal returns, we use the same size-and MTB-based benchmark portfolios to calculate returns on the investment in the acquiring firm's stock that is held for a period of up to 48 months. Abnormal performance is therefore computed as the difference between the acquiring firm's stock return and the equally weighted investment into the size-and MTB-ranked portfolio that the acquiring bank belongs to. This portfolio is rebalanced every month and if the bank moves to another portfolio, then the new portfolio is used as a benchmark.
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Since short-term abnormal returns are not as sensitive to the benchmark used as the longterm returns (Ikenberry et al. (1995) ), as a short-term measure we calculate the CARs over ±3, ±6
and ±10 days around the announcement date. The abnormal results are calculated relative to the beta-adjusted market model, when the CRSP value-weighted index is used as a proxy for market returns. To estimate the market model parameters, alpha (an intercept) and beta (a slope), we take a sample of stock-price daily returns at {-250;-30) days before the announcement and regress it on the CRSP value-weighted index of daily returns over the same period. Then we use the regression coefficients (market alpha and beta) to calculate the predicted stock returns and use the predicted values to calculate CARs.
IV. Empirical Results
A. Main findings
====== PUT FIGURE 1 HERE ========
We first wanted to convince ourselves that the two learning mechanisms described in the theory section were actually different variables, as opposed to two different proxies of the same learning construct. Figure 1 provides some comfort in this respect, as the plot of experience levels and tools developed by the responding banks does not cluster around a straight line. There are banks that perform numerous acquisitions without developing many acquisition tools and there are banks that have many tools developed even after very few acquisition experiences. The variation in the degree of codification of the acquisition practice is particularly striking at low and medium experience levels, where no pattern of correlation between the two variables is discernable. The pair correlation, shown in Table 1 , reports a .47 correlation index, which is statistically significant but not as large as one would expect if they were two proxies of the same construct. By comparison, acquirer's size's correlation with acquisition experience is even higher (.52).
======= PUT TABLE 1 HERE ======== Table 1 also shows the mean and standard deviation values of the variables entered in the model specified above. With respect to the magnitude of the mean values of the performance measures, a set of t-tests confirm that none of the financial measures adopted to approximate long-term performance result to have a mean value significantly different from zero. This result is consistent with the prevailing result in the literature (Jensen and Ruback (1983) ), Jarrell et al. (1988) , Frank et al. (1991) , Loderer and Martin (1992) ). Looking at the pair correlation coefficients, it is interesting to notice that the degree of replacement of the target's management exhibits a significantly negative correlation with both long-term performance measures, while the level of integration is not significant. The capability-development measures show comparable correlational evidence, in that acquisition experience was not correlated with any performance measure, while knowledge codification was positively correlated. This is a first clue to the importance of explaining organizational learning processes with two distinct effects: the experience accumulation and the knowledge codification processes. While they are clearly correlated with each other, they do exhibit different implications for acquisition performance.
======= PUT TABLE 2 HERE ========
Given the large and significant correlation coefficients tying many of the explanatory variables, though, a multiple regression analysis is necessary in order to verify the net contribution of each of them to the variation of the dependent variable. Table 2 shows the results of OLS estimations of the model presented above with each of the performance measures utilized. The standardized coefficients of the impact of each independent variable on the different performance approximations are presented in the different columns. Coefficients for nested models are reported in the table columns when using 48 months CARs and buy-and-hold abnormal returns as performance measures.
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The overall fit of the model tested with the data utilized is strong in all nested models that used independent variables other than controls (F values ranging from 7.38 to 11.5, adjusted R 2 statistics as high as .4445). For comparison, regressions with control-only variables had F values of 1.08 and 1.11 and adjusted R 2 being as low as .0026.
The individual regression coefficients show similar effects for both long-term performance measures. With respect to the post-acquisition integration decisions, the level of integration influences performance in a significant and positive way (p values <0.01), lending support to H1, while the replacement of the top management team of the acquired firm has a negative and significant impact (p<0.01), as per the formulation of H2. It is to be noted that the magnitude of these coefficients is the largest among all the explanatory variables of the model.
Hypothesis H3 is not confirmed by regression results -the interactive term between managerial
replacement and target quality are not significant, meaning that management replacement does not affect high quality targets more than it affects poorly performing companies. Combined with H2, this means that even in poorly performing companies managerial replacement creates negative effect on post-acquisition performance of the company.
Regarding the capability-building part of the model, acquisition experience does not show any significant impact, failing to support H4, while the degree of knowledge codification has positive effect on abnormal returns in the full model (p<0.01), thereby supporting H5.
Interestingly, the interaction term between the level of integration and the degree of knowledge codification show a positive and significant impact (p<0.1 for CARs and p<0.05 for "Buy and
Hold" abnormal returns), confirming the proposition advanced in H7 on the increasing role that knowledge codification assumes, as a collective learning mechanism, with increasing degrees of complexity of the integration task. Interaction term between past acquisition experience and knowledge codification is negative and strongly significant (p<.01 for CARs and p<0.05 for "Buy and Hold" abnormal returns).
Concerning the other control measures entered in the model, the quality of the target's assets has a significant and negative impact on all financial dependent variables. If the assessment of the target's asset quality for private firms (as they typically are in this sample) can be considered the best available proxy for Tobin's Q, this result is interpretable as being consistent with Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989) . Another interpretation might be offered observing that the direction in the knowledge flows between acquirer and target required in the case of high vs. low asset quality is an important antecedent of post-acquisition performance. Transferring acquirer's resources and capabilities to the target seems to be a more powerful way to create shareholders' value than doing the opposite (i.e. learning from the target), at least in the context under study.
However, the long-run performance should not depend on this factor, as it should have been entirely anticipated at the announcement (e.g., Table 3 provides evidence of strong negative significance of the target quality for short-term abnormal returns around the announcement dates). Therefore, the market is either too optimistic about the post-acquisition acquirers' performance after acquiring good firms or too pessimistic about their performance after acquiring poorly performing firms.
The target's geographic market overlap with the acquirer is positive. It is not significant in regressions with controls-only variables and 10% and 5% significant in other models.
======= PUT TABLE 3 HERE ========
We have to make sure that our results are not caused by strong initial reaction at the time of merger announcement. 15 In order to check this, we regress short-term abnormal returns (±3, ±6
and ±10 days around acquisition announcement dates) on the same set of independent variables.
Results are reported in Table 3 . As one can see, only target quality consistently shows up as a significant negative factor -the same sign as for long-term performance measure. Neither the post-acquisition decision, nor the integration capability factors demonstrate significant impact on short-term performance.
B. Robustness of the results
In order to check for the stability of these results to varying specifications of the dependent variable, we replicated the analysis with different specifications of the long-term stock returns (monthly CARs using beta-adjusted model and Fama-French three-factor model), obtaining results substantially similar to the ones reported. We also wanted to ensure that the fact that we have multiple responses for each bank does not vitiate our results and ran the model with control dummy variables for all banks that had performed more than 15 acquisitions (11 of them), for which fixed effects should be strongest. Regression results are consistent with the findings reported above with respect to the support of the hypothesized effects of integration decisions and learning processes.
We also checked that our results were not subject to sample selection bias. Results of the OLS regression in the Heckman two-stage procedure are reported in Table 4. Comparing Tables   2 and 4 we see that after this correction, results remain identical. Heckman correction coefficient, lambda, is insignificant for all regressions. After correction, knowledge codification becomes less significant (p<.05) in four years CAR regression.
======= PUT TABLE 4 HERE ========
The other direction of exploration to test for the robustness of these results was towards a deeper understanding of the effects of the capability development mechanisms on postacquisition performance. As described in the theory section, there are several reasons to believe that the tacit and explicit learning effects might not be linear. The first acquisition experiences might be inappropriately applied to seemingly similar but inherently different contexts, therefore having a negative effect on performance, which will attenuate and eventually reverse with increasing experience levels. Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) , for example, find a U-shaped relationship between acquisition experience and performance. The degree of codification of the acquisition process might suffer from the opposite problem, as the costs of updating the manuals and systems created, as well as the implicit bureaucratic load rise as the acquirer reaches very high levels of explicit learning behavior. An inverted U-shaped curve between codification and performance might therefore be expected in this case.
To investigate the empirical relevance of these arguments in our sample of acquisitions, we include squared terms for knowledge codification and acquisition experience into the regression equation.
======= PUT TABLE 5 HERE ======== Table 5 shows the results of an OLS regression analyses when square terms for the knowledge codification and the acquisition experience variables are included. In the first model, we enter only the linear and quadratic terms of experience accumulation, which show a significant U-shaped effect, similar to the one found by Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) . When we enter the linear and quadratic effects of knowledge codification, though, the significance of the experiences effects is lost, and a non-linear (inverted U-shaped) effect of knowledge codification is found to be significant, with significant and positive main effect and significantly negative quadratic coefficient for all the specifications of the dependent variable. Contrary to expectations, though, acquisition experience does not reach significance levels neither in its main nor in its quadratic effect, even though the signs reveal a unanimous directional tendency towards the U-shaped relationship (negative main and positive quadratic effects).These results might indicate that the quadratic effect found by Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) might be due to model misspecification, since the effect of knowledge codification was not considered.
V. Conclusions
This paper advanced a set of theoretical arguments as possible explanations of the mechanisms through which acquiring firms can learn how to manage the post-acquisition integration process, and under what conditions these mechanisms might and might not work. The empirical analysis used a combination of financial, accounting and questionnaire response data to estimate the performance implications of a complex model which included, in addition to tacit and explicit learning mechanisms, post-acquisition integration decisions as well as pre-acquisition characteristics of the two firms. Results suggest that firms do learn from their past acquisition experience, but in a complex and non-linear way. Two learning mechanisms -knowledge codification and past acquisition experience act as substitutes. Experience accumulation is not sufficient to directly impact performance, as the low frequency, high heterogeneity and high complexity of acquisition processes prevent standard learning-by-doing mechanisms from displaying their positive effects. However, specific investments in explicit learning processes aimed at the articulation and codification of lessons learned from prior acquisition experiences do exhibit significant and positive impact on performance, especially when the acquired bank becomes highly integrated into the structure of the acquiring company. The development of acquisition-specific tools, such as manuals and decision-support systems, has in fact a positive effect on performance, but is also subject to decreasing marginal benefits, presumably due to increasingly high updating costs and bureaucratic loads.
The second important set of findings relates to the performance effects of post-acquisition integration decisions. The level of integration positively impacts performance while the replacement of the target's top management, controlling for the effect of target's asset quality, negatively impacts performance. These results suggest that the value creation process in acquisitions is crucially influenced by the way acquirers manage the integration phase, over and above the pre-acquisition characteristics of the acquired business. In particular, the negative sign in the performance impact of the replacement of the target's top management team indicates that, all other things being equal, the substitution or disposition of the target's leadership is likely to destroy, as opposed to enhance, shareholders' value. Not only is the value of human capital as well as social capital lost, but also the complexity of the integration process might grow exponentially, due to the non-cooperative or even antagonistic environment, which might be expected as a consequence of the perception of unfair decision-making in the post-acquisition phase.
These effects, however, are only present in the models with long-term financial performance measures, which brings us to the third and final conclusion to be drawn from the results of the analyses presented. The financial markets do not seem to incorporate all publicly available and potentially valuable information into prices immediately after the acquisition announcement. Significant long-term abnormal returns have been identified in connection with acquirer's size, target's asset quality, acquirer's learning (both linearly and non-linearly) and acquirer's post-acquisition decisions. A possible explanation for this result rests on two arguments. The first has to do with the lack of communication of these decisions on the part of the acquiring firm. The development of integration plans might require significant effort and information unavailable before the completion of the transaction; the decisions might simply not be made before several months after the announcement. Also, acquirers might refrain from disclosing the integration decisions both at the time of the announcement and afterwards in order to avoid threats of legal suits. Doing so, though, does not allow the financial markets to form a thorough opinion on the chances of success of the completed acquisition. The second explanation is that financial markets should be able to anticipate at least the general integration approach, based on past acquisitive behavior, and to assess the acquirer's ability to deliver, based on past performance record. The fact that they do not seem to have been able to do so (at least at the time of the sample collection) poses some important questions as to the limits of market efficiency in the context of complex corporate events such as the announcement of acquisitions. An interesting extension of this study, in fact, would be to examine the markets' ability to anticipate firms' postevent behavior in other complex corporate events, such as the announcement of joint-ventures, of strategic alliances, of market entries, and so on.
Some of the limitations of the present study need to be addressed in future research as well. First, the study is situated in a specific industry context, the banking sector, which might be subject to idiosyncratic mechanisms for the creation of value in acquisition contexts, for the management of integration processes and for the development of integration-specific capabilities.
Generalizability of our results can be then probed by replicating the analysis with data from significantly different industry domains, such as the high-tech sector, or through a multi-industry study. Second, the design of the present study has deliberately excluded the acquisition of nonbanking assets by banking firms. Some of our results might be dependent upon the fact that no diversification-driven acquisitions have been allowed in the sample, and should be probed by extending the sample to a wider variety of targets. On a more theoretical ground, the dimensions of the integration process studied might not, and probably are not, exhaustive of the possible list of key factors explaining integration behavior by acquiring firms. The speed of execution, for example, is a relevant dimension that has not been examined neither theoretically, nor empirically. Similarly, the learning mechanisms identified and studied in this work might be a poor representation of the alternatives available to the acquiring firm to develop collective competence specific to the management of acquisition processes. For example, external aid might come from management consulting firms, and the attention of top management at the corporate level towards the execution of the first few integration processes at the divisional level might be a powerful stimulus to speed up collective learning.
The model tested does not include some of the predictors of performance related to the characteristics of the negotiation process, such as the form of payment (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Travlos and Papaioannou, 1991) , which have been tested in the prior literature. In the perspective adopted, which aims at the explanation of the variance in post-acquisition performance as opposed to assessing the location of the mean of the performance distribution, this should not affect the validity of the results. The characteristics of the negotiation process should be uncorrelated with the impact of post-acquisition decisions on performance, and is definitely noncorrelated with the impact of learning mechanisms on performance. In other words, whatever explanatory power is exhibited by the characteristics of the negotiation process, it should be reflected in the unexplained portion of the variance in the dependent variable, as opposed to be influencing the sign and magnitude of the estimated coefficients.
While we have little doubt that a lot of work is needed in order to uncover the possible contingencies that might explain the variation between superior and poor performance in acquisition processes, we also believe that the findings of the present study might be important to bring the attention of scholars towards understanding the root causes of shareholders' value creation in corporate acquisitions, over and above factors related to the negotiation of the merger agreement and the pre-acquisition features of the two firms.
ENDNOTES
1 Wells Fargo bank, rated in 1995 by IBCA as the world's most profitable bank, was brought on the verge of failure by the disastrous outcome of its acquisition of the First Interstate Bank in 1996 before being saved by a $34 Billion merger with Norwest in 1998. This is just one dramatic example from the industry that recently witnessed from $75 to $285 Billion M&A deals per year (Source: SNL database). 2 Note that the focus of this paper is not on the assessment of the mean of post-acquisition performance, a question that captured the attention of most scholars studying the acquisition phenomenon (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Asquith et al., 1983; Jarrell et al., 1988; Franks et al. 1991; Agrawal et al, 1992; Loderer & Martin, 1992; Loughran & Vijh, 1997) . Rather, it focuses on the identification of the factors capable of explaining the variance around that mean.
3 Results using long-term accounting abnormal returns are available upon request 4 It is worth to note that, similarly to the general study of corporate acquisitions, scholars in the bank mergers field have primarily focused on the study of the mean of the post-acquisition performance distribution for bank acquirers (Rhoades, 1994; Pilloff and Santomero, 1998; Berger et al. 1999; Calomiris, 1999) and are just starting to tackle the challenge of explaining the variance around that mean (DeLong, 2001 ). Pilloff and Santomero (1998) are particularly sensitive to this issue in their call for scholarly effort on the identification of antecedents to bank merger performance. 5 See Yelle (1979) , Dutton and Thomas (1984) and Argote (1999) for good reviews of the vast literature on learning curves, primarily developed in the operations management area. The application to general firm learning processes has been made on a theoretical level by the behavioral school (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963) and the evolutionary economics tradition (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter, 1987; Nelson, 1995) 6 A manual on the information systems conversion process or on the affiliation of the target's human resources, an electronic model to support decisions about the staffing of the acquired bank's branches or about comparing and standardizing the two product lines are some examples in point. 7 We used the SNL's variable "in-market acquisition". It is not the same as the "same state" acquisition, as there are cases in which acquirers were already present in the target's state of origin (in-market acquisition of a bank with different state of origin) and there are cases in which small acquirers were not present in the counties of the same state of origin of the two banks (out-market acquisition in the same state). 8 Because surveys could be send only to the banks that existed at the time of mailing, this could introduce survivorship bias in our results. An indirect proof that this was not the case was the failure to reject the hypothesis that performance of target firms was equal to the performance of acquiring firms. 9 Note that we are using accounting and financial returns of only publicly listed firms, thereby inserting an unavoidable bias in the sample of acquirers considered (Palia (1993) ). However, only 4 of the 51 firms that originally responded to our questionnaire had to be deleted for this, as well as other, problem with incomplete data. 10 We also performed analysis using accounting measure of abnormal performance. Description of this measure and results are available upon request. 11 Results for the beta-adjusted market model and Fama-French three-factor model are available upon request. 12 Note that the use of Market-to-Book ratio for the acquiring firm provides a good proxy for the Tobin's Q metric. Combined with the measure of resource quality for the target firm, the best available proxy of Tobin's Q for the typically non-quoted target, we can provide a test of the difference in Tobin's Q of the acquirer and target firm, consistently with Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989) . 13 Similar analyses were performed using the CARs and buy-and-hold for 36 months and for CARs with a betaadjusted model and using CARs relative to the Fama-French three-factor model, with essentially similar results with respect to the experience and the knowledge codification variables, while weaker results for the post-acquisition integration decision variables. 14 SNL determines the geographic market overlap by presence of acquirer's and target's branches in the same counties. There are many cases in which acquirers were already present in the target's state of origin, although different from their own state of origin. Sometimes small acquirers were not present in the counties of the same state of origin of the two banks, and such acquisition is "out-market" although in the same state. 15 For example, one could argue that strong negative impact of managerial replacement on long-term post-acquisition performance is a result of the market overoptimistic initial positive reaction The sample contains data about 320 mergers and acquisitions by 47 US banks from 1986 to 1998. The sample sources are SNL and SDC databases (announcement dates for mergers and acquisitions), COMPUSTAT (accounting data about the acquiring banks), CRSP (accounting data about the acquiring banks) and responses to a questionnaire-based survey. CAR 48 months are cumulative abnormal returns over 48 months after the announcement relative to one of a 100 size-and market-to-book (MTB) ratio based benchmark portfolios. Buy & Hold 48 m. are abnormal returns relative to the same benchmark portfolios, but assuming a buy-and-hold strategy. Acquirer's size is the size (in $ bln.) of the acquirer's total assets in the year of acquisition announcement. Relative target size is the size of the target bank assets as a percentage of the acquirer's total assets at the time of acquisition announcement. Pre-88 acquisitions is a dummy variable equal 1, if the acquisition was announced before 1988. Pre-90 acquisitions is a dummy variable equal 1, if the acquisition was announced before 1990. Target quality is the acquirer's assessment of target's pre-acquisition performance (-2 is the worst and +2 is the best performance). Target relatedness is the binary variable equal 1 if it is "in-market acquisition" in SNL. Level of integration is the acquirer's assessment of the post-acquisition integration with the target (1 is the lowest integration with the target and 4 is the highest integration). Top management replacement is the acquirer's assessment of the degree of the target's top management post-acquisition replacement (1 is the lowest degree of replacement and 4 is the highest). Acquisition experience is the number of acquisitions performed by the acquirer before the focal one. Knowledge codification is the number of tools developed by the acquiring firm at the time of the focal acquisition. Table 2 shows the ordinary least square regression results (standardized coefficients, F-statistics and adjusted R 2 ) for nested regression models. The full regression equation is
VARIABLES
The variables are as described in Table 1 . The sample contains data about 119 mergers and acquisitions performed in 1986-1995 and is a subsample of the sample described in Table 1 Table 3 shows the ordinary least square regression results (standardized coefficients, F-statistics and adjusted R 2 ) for nested regression models. The full regression equation is Abnormal return = a + b × integration + c × replacement + d × experience + e × codification + f × codification-integration + g × experience-integration + h × experience-codification + controls + ε The independent variables are as described in Table 1 . Dependent variables are cumulative abnormal daily returns over 6, 12 and 20 days around the acquisition announcement dates. The benchmark portfolios are beta-adjusted market portfolios. The sample contains data about 195 mergers and acquisitions performed in 1986-1997 and is a subsample of the sample described in Table 1 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 Standardized coefficients. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level Table 4 shows coefficients, F-statistics and adjusted R 2 for the ordinary least square regression with Heckman selection bias correction for full models with dependent variables being CAR and Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns over 36 and 48 months. Heckman two-stage procedure with consistent estimates of standard errors for the second stage OLS is used. The sample for the first stage (probit model) uses data about 605 banks from Compustat. The probit equation is: Selection = Intercept + α × total assets + β × ROA + e, where Selection is equal to 1 if bank belongs to the M&A sample and zero otherwise. The second stage uses the ordinary least square regression modified to obtain consistent errors following Greene (1981) . The regression equation is Abnormal performance = a + b × integration + c × replacement + d × experience + e × codification + f × codification-integration + g × experience-integration + h × experience-codification + lambda + controls + ε
The Abnormal performance = a + b × integration + c × replacement + d × experience + e × codification + f × experience 2 + g × codification 2 + h × codificationintegration + controls + ε Panels B-C report coefficients associated with learning and experience in full linear regression Abnormal performance = a + b × integration + c × replacement + d × experience + e × codification + f × codification-integration + controls + ε when sample is restricted to low (less than 7) codification (Panel B), to high (greater than 6) codification (Panel C), to low (less than 10) experience (Panel D) and high (greater than 9) experience (Panel E). The variables are as described in Table 1 . The sample contains data about 114 mergers and acquisitions performed in 1986-1995 and is a subsample of the sample described in Table 1 Standardized coefficients. Significant at the 0.01 (***), 0.05(**) or 0.10 (*) level 
